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OF FRACKING FLUID DISCLOSURES:
TENSIONS AND TRENDS
CODY B. JOHNSON
Abstract
Hydraulic fracturing is a controversial, yet invaluable, facet of the
American energy industry. Among the myriad of environmental issues
posed by hydraulic fracturing, the chemically treated fluids used in the
fracturing process have engendered significant public concern, resulting in
a growing push to mandate the disclosure of fluid formulas. In response,
the energy industry has resisted these efforts by treating the formulas as
trade secrets. Presently, the fight over fracking fluid disclosures is a
stalemate between the public’s right to know the chemical contents injected
into the earth and the energy industry’s right to protect its proprietary
trade secrets. Indeed, while a growing number of state regulations require
the disclosure of fracking fluid formulas, every one of these regulations
includes an exception for trade secrets.
Given the unceasing doctrinal tension and lack of uniform regulation in
this area, commentators have proposed that the proper balance between
public disclosure and competitive incentives lies in the use of patents to
protect fracking fluids. However, this Note argues that patents are
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graduation, the author will join the Dallas office of Baker Botts LLP as a litigation associate.
He would like to thank Professor Jeff Civins, who provided invaluable guidance and
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untenable as a means of protecting fracking fluid formulas for many of the
existing operators in the energy industry. Specifically, I contend that
patentability issues like novelty and the public use bar, coupled with the
practical problems of patent prosecution, eliminate patents as a viable
alternative to trade secret protections for most fracking operators.
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I. Introduction
In 1997, a revolution began on the north Texas plains that revitalized the
American energy sector and permanently altered the geopolitical landscape.
Ultimately, the “revolution” that began in Texas’s Barnett Shale brought
hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”) into the energy sector’s mainstream and
ushered in a boom in domestic oil and gas production.
However, as fracking spread to shale plays throughout the country,
environmental concerns and controversy spread with it. Chief among these
concerns are the environmental risks posed by the fluids used to fracture the
shale, specifically the risk that chemicals in the fracking fluids may
contaminate groundwater sources or spread on the surface in the event of an
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accident on a fracking well. In the eyes of the energy sector, the specific
compositions of fracking fluids, which often include specially formulated
chemical additives, are valuable and confidential information—the kind of
intellectual property protected through the law of trade secrets. Conversely,
because of the potential environmental harms involved, environmentalists,
citizen groups, and government agencies have treated fracking fluid
compositions as information the public has a right to know.
These conflicting views are locked in tremendous tension. At its core,
this tension involves balancing “the public’s interest in identifying
chemicals which may find their way into groundwater, and the industry’s
need to protect proprietary information in order to maintain a competitive
advantage.”1 Repeated attempts to strike this balance with mandatory
disclosure regulations at the federal level have failed. Thus, fracking fluid
regulation has been relegated entirely to the states. While state fracking
regulations have shed some light on fluid compositions, every mandatory
fluid disclosure regulation implemented to date includes an exception for
trade secrets and proprietary information.
This Note will address the inherent tension between fracking disclosure
regulations and the fracking operators’ right to protect their intellectual
property and will examine the viability of using patents as a meaningful
compromise between protection and disclosure. Part I introduces fracking
and its vital role in oil and gas production, along with the basic tenets of
trade secret law—fracking operators’ preferred means of protecting their
fluid compositions. Additionally, Part I will address the environmental
concerns surrounding fracking fluids and the push for mandatory disclosure
regulations. Part II will provide an overview of the lack of federal fracking
fluid regulation and the framework of existing regulatory schemes used by
the states. Part III will discuss the tensions between trade secrets and
disclosure schemes as illustrated by two highly controversial problem areas:
(1) the public’s push for greater transparency and litigation involving
records requests for fracking disclosures and (2) the medical community’s
calls for greater access to fracking fluid compositions. Part IV will examine
the growing trend of “fracking patents”—fracking technology and fluids
protected under the patent system rather than trade secret law. Ultimately,
this Note will evaluate the relative advantages of “fracking patents,” and
conclude that patents are a superior, yet impractical, means of protecting
fracking fluid technologies for most operators, and that the patent system is
1. Powder River Basin Res. Council v. Wyo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n, 2014
WY 37, 320 P.3d 222, 225 (Wyo. 2014).
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not a long-term solution for the intractable tension between fracking fluids
and the public’s right to disclosure.
A. Hydraulic Fracturing and the “Shale Revolution”
At its most basic, fracking is “the injection of fluid into shale beds at
high pressure in order to free up petroleum resources.”2 More specifically,
hydraulic fracturing is a process by which a well is stimulated with
specially blended liquids injected into a high-pressure formation, causing
the formation to crack open and allowing oil or gas to flow into the
wellbore. 3 The most prevalent form of hydraulic fracturing is “slickwater
fracking,” which involves pumping chemically treated fluid into the well
with “proppants” used to keep the fractures open and create a more
consistent flow of oil or gas.4 These chemically treated “slickwater” fluids
are at the core of the controversy over public disclosure and the focus of
this Note.
Despite its recent prominence, fracking is not a recent invention.
Fracking technology was invented by the Stanolind Oil & Gas Company in
1947.5 Over the next four decades, fracking technology proliferated steadily
but unremarkably, with its primary use in traditional “vertical” wells. 6
Although fracking was recognized for its usefulness in low-permeability
geological formations,7 fracking was not utilized in shales—tightly packed
geological formations made up of “finely divided particles of older rocks.” 8
Then, in 1997, the fracking “game” changed when Mitchell Energy
utilized slickwater hydraulic fracturing in the Barnett Shale outside of Fort
Worth. 9 Mitchell’s unconventional use of fracking in the tight shale
formation generated “remarkable” results—after ninety days of operation,
Mitchell’s S.H. Griffin No. 3 well produced more than one million cubic

2. HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL & GAS TERMS at
“F” (Matthew Bender & Co. Inc., 17th ed. 2018).
3. Id.
4. John D. Furlow & John R. Hays Jr., Disclosure with Protection of Trade Secrets
Comes to the Hydraulic Fracturing Revolution, 7 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 289, 295
(2011).
5. Kristen van de Biezenbos, Contracted Fracking, 92 TUL. L. REV. 587, 597 (2018).
6. See Keith B. Hall, Hydraulic Fracturing: Trade Secrets and the Mandatory
Disclosure of Fracturing Water Composition, 49 IDAHO L. REV. 399, 403 (2013).
7. See id. at 404.
8. Manual of Oil & Gas Terms, supra note 3, at “S.”
9. Furlow & Hays, supra note 4, at 297.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol6/iss3/7

2021] Intellectual Property & the Law of Fracking Fluid Disclosures 447
feet of natural gas, a record for the formation at the time. 10 By 2001,
Mitchell’s Barnett wells were producing 365 million cubic feet of natural
gas a day, a 250% increase from production just two years prior. 11 Despite
Mitchell’s success in the Barnett, the turning point of the fracking
revolution came in 2002 when Devon Energy, an Oklahoma-based
hydrocarbon exploration company, acquired Mitchell.12 Devon combined
Mitchell’s slickwater fracking techniques with its expertise—the process of
horizontal drilling. With horizontal drilling, the wellbore angles
horizontally after it reaches a certain depth, penetrating a greater length of
the carbon reservoir and offering significant production improvements over
traditional vertical drilling.13 This combination proved incredibly effective
in the tightly packed Barnett Shale, and it represented a “worldwide
breakthrough” in fracking as a means of oil and gas production. 14
Thus, the so-called “shale revolution” was born with Devon’s
combination of slickwater fracking and horizontal drilling. 15 The production
boom in the Barnett led to massive growth in natural gas shale development
across the country. Throughout the 2000s, the combination of fracking and
horizontal drilling was used to develop shale plays like the Haynesville
Shale in east Texas and Louisiana, the Fayetteville Shale in Arkansas, and
the Marcellus Shale in western Pennsylvania, New York, and West
Virginia.16
During this time, shale gas production in the United States grew
exponentially. In 2002, the United States produced 5.2 trillion cubic feet of
shale gas.17 In 2019, it produced 26.2 trillion cubic feet of shale gas. 18
10. Gregory Zuckerman, Breakthrough: The Accidental Discovery That Revolutionized
American Energy, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 6, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/
archive/2013/11/breakthrough-the-accidental-discovery-that-revolutionized-americanenergy/281193/.
11. Id.
12. R. Marcus Cady, II, Drilling into the Issues: A Critical Analysis of Urban Drilling’s
Legal, Environmental, and Regulatory Implications, 16 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 127, 133
(2009).
13. Furlow & Hays, supra note 4, at 291 n.3.
14. Daniel R. Cahoy et al., Fracking Patents: The Emergence of Patent as InformationContainment Tools in Shale Drilling, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 279, 286
(2013).
15. THE U.S. SHALE REVOLUTION, https://www.strausscenter.org/energy-and-security/
the-u-s-shale-revolution.html#FN1, (last visited Mar. 25, 2020).
16. Hall, supra note 6, at 404.
17. NATURAL GAS EXPLAINED, U.S. Energy Information Administration, https://www.
eia.gov/energyexplained/natural-gas/where-our-natural-gas-comes-from.php, (last visited
Mar. 25, 2020).
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Moreover, the shale revolution caused shale gas to play an outsized role in
American natural gas production—it accounted for 27.3% of the natural gas
produced in 2002; in 2019, 81% of American natural gas was shale gas. 19
Perhaps more importantly, the shale revolution drastically altered the
crude oil industry. While the initial fracking boom focused on natural gas,
energy producers were quick to utilize fracking and horizontal drilling in
shale formations that produce oil. 20 The fracking of this “tight oil” now
accounts for 61% of U.S. crude oil production. 21 Four key shale plays
account for 87% of all tight oil prod**uction: the Bakken in Montana and
North Dakota (32%), the Eagle Ford in Texas (28%), the Permian in Texas
and New Mexico (23%), and the Niobrara-Codell in Colorado and
Wyoming (4%). 22 This newfound boom in tight oil has allowed the United
States to equal or surpass Saudi Arabia in crude oil production every year
since 201323 and has led to a significant decrease in America’s dependence
on foreign crude oil.24
In short, fracking is an economic and geopolitical force that has
catalyzed significant growth in the United States and added hundreds of
thousands of jobs to the energy sector. 25
B. Fracking and the Law of Trade Secrets
Every jurisdiction in the United States recognizes protection for trade
secrets.26 The vast majority of these jurisdictions have adopted the
provisions of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”). 27 According to the
UTSA:

18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Hall, supra note 6, at 404–05.
21. HOW MUCH SHALE (TIGHT) OIL IS PRODUCED IN THE UNITED STATES?, U.S. Energy
Information Administration, https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=847&t=6, (last
visited Mar. 25, 2020).
22. Id.
23. PETROLEUM AND OTHER LIQUIDS DATA, U.S. Energy Information Administration,
https://www.eia.gov/international/data/world, (last visited Mar. 25, 2020).
24. THE U.S. SHALE REVOLUTION, supra note 15.
25. Id.
26. PETER S. MENNELL, MARK A. LEMLEY & ROBERT P. MERGES, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE : 2019, VOLUME I: PERSPECTIVES, TRADE
SECRETS AND PATENTS 47 (Clause 8 Publishing, 2019).
27. Id.
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(4) “Trade Secret” means information, including a formula,
pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or
process that:
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential,
from not being generally known to, and not being readily
ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can
obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain its secrecy. 28
The UTSA’s definition of a trade secret emphasizes the secret’s
economic value to its owner. This economic rationale is ingrained in the
requirement that a trade secret holder must make reasonable efforts to
protect the secret from disclosure. 29 At bottom, a trade secret claim has
three essential elements: (1) the subject matter involved must be the type of
knowledge or information protected by trade secret law; (2) the knowledge
or information must be subject to reasonable precautions to protect its
secrecy; and (3) the plaintiff must establish that the defendant
misappropriated the trade secret.30
While trade secret law has historically been grounded in doctrines of tort
law and property rights, the modern approach has been to view trade secrets
as intellectual property rights that incentivize innovation in the
marketplace.31 In this vein, fracking operators have treated various aspects
of their fracking fluids as confidential trade secrets to maintain an
advantage over their competitors. 32 Specifically, fracking operators use
trade secret law to protect the overall composition of their fracking fluids,
specific chemical additives, the blending process, and ratios of the fluid. 33
Moreover, courts have generally allowed fracking operators to protect their
28. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985).
29. MENNELL, LEMLEY & MERGES, supra note 26, at 49.
30. Id.
31. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481–85 (1974) (“Trade secret
law will encourage invention in areas where patent law does not reach, and will prompt the
independent innovator to proceed with the discovery and exploitation of his invention.
Competition is fostered and the public is not deprived of the use of valuable, if not quite
patentable, inventions.”).
32. Hall, supra note 6, at 406.
33. John D. Furlow & Corinne V. Snow, In the Wake of the Shale Revolution: A Primer
on Hydraulic Fracturing Fluid Chemical Disclosure, 8 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 249,
260 (2012).
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technology from “competitive injury” through trade secret claims for legal
and injunctive relief.34
In addition to protecting fracking operators from “competitive injury” at
the hands of competitors and former employees, trade secret protections
have served to prevent the disclosure of fluid compositions to regulators
and the public. 35 Effectively, fracking operators have used their interest in
protecting proprietary information to defeat every attempt to mandate the
complete disclosure of fluid compositions, as evidenced by the fact that
every state fracking fluid disclosure regime includes an exception for trade
secrets.36
C. Environmental Concerns and the Push for Mandatory Disclosure
Although fracking fluids are predominantly composed of water and sand
(typically around 99% of the fluid), there is significant public concern that
the chemical additives of the slickwater fluids contain harmful
carcinogens.37 The genesis of this concern is the possibility that chemicals
in the fluids will enter ground- and surface-water during the fracking
process, creating the potential for human ingestion.38 This concern is
bolstered by studies that have identified a link between water contamination
and the flow and discharge of slickwater fluid in areas where fracking is
common. 39 More specifically, researchers have identified unusually high
concentrations of chemicals like methane in “active” fracking areas. 40 Other
studies have identified chemical contamination in groundwater sources
around active fracking areas in West Virginia and Kentucky. 41

34. See Core Labs. LP v. Spectrum Tracer Servs., L.L.C., 532 F. App’x 904, 909–10
(Fed. Cir. 2013) (applying Texas law).
35. John M. Golden & Hannah J. Wiseman, The Fracking Revolution: Shale Gas as a
Case Study in Innovation Policy, 64 EMORY L.J. 955, 962 (2015).
36. See infra Part II.B.
37. Julie E. Zink, When Trade Secrecy Goes Too Far: Public Health and Safety Should
Trump Corporate Profits, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1135, 1158 (2018).
38. Id. at 1159; Elliott Fink, Note, Dirty Little Secrets: Fracking Fluids, Dubious Trade
Secrets, Confidential Contamination, and the Public Health Information Vacuum, 29
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 971, 983 (2019).
39. Stephen G. Osborn et al., Methane Contamination of Drinking Water Accompanying
Gas-Well Drilling and Hydraulic Fracturing, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 8172, 8172–73
(2011).
40. Id. at 8173.
41. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, MGMT. OF WASTES FROM THE EXPLORATION,
DEV., AND PROD. OF CRUDE OIL, NATURAL GAS, AND GEOTHERMAL ENERGY (1987),
https://archive.epa.gov/epawaste/nonhaz/industrial/special/web/pdf/530sw88003a.pdf.
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Although these studies have not conclusively identified fracking as the
cause of the contamination, they have led to increased calls for government
regulation of fracking and the mandatory disclosure of fracking fluid
compositions.42 This pro-regulation movement has been amplified by highprofile fracking incidents, like the 2014 explosion of a fracking well in
Monroe County, Ohio that released thousands of gallons of fracking fluids
into Opossum Creek, a tributary of the Ohio River. 43 The introduction of
chemicals from the well site into the Ohio River exacted a significant
ecological toll on the area and killed over 70,000 fish. 44 In the wake of the
Monroe County incident, it took Halliburton, the well’s operator, five days
to disclose the chemical contents of the fracking fluids involved to federal,
state, and local authorities.45 The fact that the firefighters responding to the
Monroe County incident, as well as the EPA and Ohio state authorities,
were kept in the dark about the chemicals involved attracted significant
media attention and garnered a comment from then-Governor John Kasich,
who stated that first responders should always have access to the chemicals
at wells sites, “including the ones protected by trade-secret laws.”46
Due in large part to outrage over incidents like the Monroe County fire,
the threat of chemically treated fluids has become “the most contentious
issue” in the larger debate surrounding oil and gas production. 47 This
contentiousness is exacerbated by a perceived lack of effective state and
federal regulation. 48 Indeed, a contemporary slate of federal legislation
aimed at regulating fracking and mandating the disclosure of fluid
compositions died on the congressional floor. 49 Simultaneous efforts at
state-level fracking regulation have met varying degrees of success, but
42. See Abrahm Lustgarten, Scientific Study Links Flammable Drinking Water to
Fracking, PROPUBLICA (May 9, 2011, 2:00 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/
scientific-study-links-flammable-drinking-water-to-fracking (citing the Osborn study in note
36).
43. Fink, supra note 38, at 973.
44. Id.
45. Laura Arenschield, Fracking Fire Points out Failings, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH
(Aug. 31, 2014), https://www.dispatch.com/article/20140831/NEWS/308319916.
46. Id.; Mariah Blake, Halliburton Fracking Spill Mystery: What Chemicals Polluted an
Ohio Waterway?, MOTHER JONES (July 24, 2014), https://www.motherjones.com/
politics/2014/07/halliburton-ohio-river-spill-fracking/.
47. Furlow & Hays, supra note 4, at 314.
48. See id. at 317.
49. See Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of Chemicals Act of 2011, H.R. 1084,
112th Cong. (2011); FUEL Act, H.R. 2133, 112th Cong. (2011); FRAC Act, S. 587, 112th
Cong. (2011).
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even the successful disclosure regulations include an exception for trade
secrets.50
Thus, opponents of secrecy in the fracking process were initially left
with voluntary disclosure measures within the oil and gas industry. The
progress of these voluntary efforts was slow and incomplete—fracking
operators invariably refused to disclose the compounds that were “most
critical” to their trade secrets, but “the information disclosed nevertheless
was more information than had been publicly disclosed before.”51 The most
substantial voluntary development has been the emergence of FracFocus, a
private entity, as a platform for fracking operators to publicly disclose their
drilling practices. 52 As a tool of “private governance,” FracFocus proved to
be so effective that it is expressly referenced as an acceptable disclosure
platform in several state fracking regulation regimes. 53
However, despite the incremental progress of voluntary fracking
disclosures, opponents of stringent trade secret protections in fracking
maintain that there is an unacceptable gap in the public’s knowledge of
fracking fluids.54
II. Federal and State Regulation of Fracking Fluids
The push for greater transparency in fracking has culminated in
increased government regulation of fracking fluids. That said, federal
regulation of the fracking industry is currently nonexistent, and the
possibility of any renewed federal efforts is “problematic at best.”55 Thus,
the most important regulatory efforts in the fracking industry are led by the
states.56 States vary in the scope and rigidity of their regulations.
Consequently, the most pronounced tensions between fracking fluid
disclosure efforts and fracking operators’ rights to their intellectual property
play out at the state level.

50. See infra Part II.B.
51. Hall, supra note 6, at 406.
52. See Amanda C. Leiter, Fracking as a Federalism Case Study, 85 U. COLO. L. REV.
1123, 1127 (2014).
53. Id. at 1127–28.
54. Fink, supra note 38, at 989–90.
55. Bruce M. Kramer, Federal Legislative and Administrative Regulation of Hydraulic
Fracturing Operations, 44 TEX. TECH L. REV. 837, 862 (2012).
56. See, e.g., William C. Mumby, Trust in Local Government: How States’ Legal
Obligations to Protect Water Resources Can Support Local Efforts to Restrict Fracking, 44
ECOLOGY L.Q. 195, 202 (2017).
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A. Federal Regulation of Fracking Fluids is Nonexistent
In 2016, Judge Scott Skavdahl of the District of Wyoming unequivocally
concluded that “Congress has expressly removed federal agency authority
to regulate [hydraulic fracturing].” 57 Although the district court’s opinion
was vacated on appeal because the Bureau of Land Management rescinded
the regulation at issue, Judge Skavdahl’s statement of the law on federal
fracking regulation is accurate.58 Simply put, fracking per se is excluded
from every meaningful federal environmental statute.
Transparency and public participation are routinely heralded as
hallmarks of American environmental statutes. 59 Nevertheless, fracking is
excluded from each of the relevant statutory candidates to shed light on
fracking fluid compositions. For instance, the Clean Water Act expressly
carves out “water, gas, or other material which is injected into a well to
facilitate production of oil or gas, or water derived in association with oil or
gas production and disposed of in a well . . . .”60 Similarly, fracking fluids,
like other oil and gas wastes, are exempted from the hazardous waste
disposal restrictions of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(“RCRA”).61
Even statutes passed with the clear goal of promoting transparency and
safety in industrial settings do not cover fracking fluids. Specifically, the
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (“EPCRA”),
which was passed in the wake of the Bhopal disaster to protect communities
from toxic hazards, does not presently cover oil and gas facilities in its
“Standard Industrial Classification.” 62 Similar regulatory efforts, such as the
57. State of Wyo. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, No. 2:15-CV-041-SWS, 2016 WL
3509415, at *11 (D. Wyo. June 21, 2016), judgment vacated, appeal dismissed sub nom.
Wyo. v. Zinke, 871 F.3d 1133 (10th Cir. 2017).
58. See Zinke, 871 F.3d at 1146.
59. See, e.g., Jeffrey G. Miller, Garrison Summary–A Generational History of
Environmental Law and its Grand Themes: A Near Decade of Garrison Lectures, 19 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 501, 506–07 (2002).
60. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (2019).
61. See 42 U.S.C. § 6291(b)(2)(A) (2006); see also Michael Goldman, Drilling into
Hydraulic Fracturing and Shale Gas Development: A Texas and Federal Environmental
Perspective, 19 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 185, 203 (2012) (explaining that the RCRA was
amended in 1980 to allow the EPA to determine whether fracking was covered by RCRA,
and that, “due to the economic importance of oil and gas development,” the EPA determined
federal regulation was unwarranted).
62. See 42 U.S.C. § 11023(b)(1)(B) (2019). However, an emergency report would likely
be required if a fluid release exceeded certain thresholds set by the EPA. See 42 U.S.C. §
11004(a)(2)(B) (2018).
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rules promulgated by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(“OSHA”), do not require fracking operators to disclose specific chemical
compositions or their quantities. 63
The threat to drinking water is at the heart of the public debate over
fracking practices. Accordingly, it is unsurprising that much of the
acrimony and litigation about the federal regulation of fracking fluids
centers on the Safe Drinking Water Act (“SDWA”). 64 The SDWA was
enacted in 1974 to prevent the degradation of drinking water, with
Underground Injection Control (“UIC”) programs serving as the primary
enforcement mechanism of the Act.65 Through the UIC program, the EPA
and state agencies are responsible for permitting and regulating operations
involving “underground injections.” 66 A state must submit a proposed UIC
program to the EPA that meets the minimum requirements established by
the SDWA.67 If the EPA approves the state’s proposed UIC program, the
state assumes primary regulatory authority and enforcement responsibility
for underground injection activities. 68
However, from 1974 through 1997, the EPA consistently determined that
fracking did not fall within the SDWA’s definition of an “underground
injection.”69 The EPA did not reevaluate this position until the Eleventh
Circuit declared it unreasonable in the so-called LEAF litigation. 70 The
LEAF cases began when the EPA denied the Legal Environmental
Assistance Foundation’s (“LEAF”) petition to withdraw the EPA’s
approval of Alabama’s UIC program.71 Alabama’s UIC program, which the
EPA approved in two parts over 1982 and 1983, did not regulate fracking as
an underground injection activity. 72 LEAF contended that the SWDA
required fracking regulation. 73 In response, the EPA took the position that
hydraulic fracturing is not an “underground injection” within the meaning
63. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.120 (2019) (does not mandate the disclosure of specific
chemical components or quantities).
64. Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300h–300h-8 (2005).
65. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300h-1–300h-3.
66. Id.
67. 42 U.S.C. § 300h-1.
68. Id.
69. See Fink, supra note 38, at 987; see also Kramer, supra note 55, at 848–49.
70. Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., Inc. v. U.S. E.P.A. (LEAF I), 118 F.3d 1467, 1471
(11th Cir. 1997); Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., Inc. v. U.S. E.P.A. (LEAF II), 276 F.3d
1253, 1255 (11th Cir. 2001).
71. LEAF I, 118 F.3d at 1469.
72. See id. at 1470–71.
73. Id. at 1471.
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of the SDWA because that term “encompass[es] only those wells whose
‘principal function’ is the underground emplacement of fluids.” 74
Because the EPA’s order denying LEAF’s initial petition was a final
agency action, the Eleventh Circuit took up LEAF’s petition for review. 75
The court applied the Chevron framework and found that the EPA’s
interpretation failed at the first step of the analysis—it failed to effectuate
Congress’s unambiguously expressed intent. 76 Because fracking involves
“subsurface emplacement,” the court concluded that it “obviously” fell
under the ordinary meaning of underground injection. 77 Thus, the court held
that the EPA exceeded its authority and contravened the plain meaning of
the SDWA by failing to regulate fracking. 78 Subsequent disagreements over
the specifics of Alabama’s modified UIC program necessitated a petition
for a writ of mandamus that brought the parties back before the Eleventh
Circuit.79 While the LEAF litigation did not ultimately lead the EPA to alter
or review other states’ UIC programs, it did “lead to a reevaluation of the
EPA’s role in regulating hydraulic fracturing.” 80
Whatever reform that reevaluation brought with it was, however, shortlived. In 2005, Congress enacted the Energy Policy Act, which amended the
SDWA’s definitions by specifically excluding “the underground injection
of fluids or propping agents (other than diesel fuels) pursuant to hydraulic
fracturing operations related to oil, gas, or geothermal production
activities.”81
As a result, there is no current federal legislation regulating hydraulic
fracking fluids. Multiple iterations of the Fracturing Responsibility and
Awareness of Chemicals Act (“FRAC Act”), which would bring fracking
under the SDWA and mandate the disclosure of fluid compositions, have
failed in Congress.82 Regulatory efforts to fill the legislative void have met
the same fate. For instance, the Department of the Interior (“DOI”)
promulgated fracking regulations in 2015 that implemented limitations
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1472.
76. Id. at 1477–78 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837 (1984)).
77. Id. at 1474–75.
78. Id. at 1477–78.
79. LEAF II, 276 F.3d at 1255.
80. Kramer, supra note 55, at 853.
81. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 322, 119 Stat. 594, 694 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300h (2005)).
82. FRAC Act, S. 587, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 1135, 113th Cong. (2013); S. 785, 114th
Cong. (2015); S. 865, 115th Cong. (2017).
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similar to the SDWA on federal and Native American lands. 83 The state of
Wyoming challenged DOI’s agency action in federal court, and the court
enjoined DOI from enforcing the regulations on the ground that DOI did
not have congressional authority to regulate fracking. 84 This decision
culminated in the court’s emphatic conclusion that Congress had “expressly
removed federal agency authority to regulate [fracking] . . . .”85 President
Trump took office during the pendency of DOI’s appeal, and the Trump
Administration subsequently rescinded the DOI’s fracking regulation,
rendering the case unripe for decision. 86
Thus, the federal government has removed itself from the regulatory
arena when it comes to fracking, leaving issues like fracking fluid
disclosure to the states.
B. State Fracking Fluid Regulations
As of 2019, twenty-eight states have enacted statutes regulating the
disclosure of fracking fluid compositions. 87 At a “general level,” these
regulations are similar: they all require fracking operators to disclose the
composition of fracking fluids, and they all exempt trade secrets from
disclosure.88 Moreover, most state disclosure regulations require trade
secret holders to disclose chemical information to first responders in the
wake of spills or medical emergencies. 89 The distinctions among the various
states primarily come in three areas: first, the method and timing of the
required disclosure;90 second, the depth of detail required in the operator’s

83. Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 80 Fed. Reg.
16,128 (Mar. 26, 2015) (codified at 43 C.F.R. § 3162.3 (rescinded)).
84. State of Wyo. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, No. 2:15-CV-041-SWS, 2016 WL
3509415, at *12 (D. Wyo. June 21, 2016), judgment vacated, appeal dismissed sub nom.
Wyo. v. Zinke, 871 F.3d 1133 (10th Cir. 2017).
85. State of Wyo., 2016 WL 3509415, at *11.
86. Zinke, 871 F.3d at 1145.
87. Lara D. Pringle, A Closer Look at Hydraulic Fracturing: An Examination of How
Various States Address Fracturing Fluid Disclosure Requirements and Baseline Testing for
Groundwater, in THE LAW OF FRACKING: FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL REGULATION OF
MODERN OIL & GAS DEVELOPMENT (Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst., 2019).
88. Hall, supra note 6, at 409.
89. See Furlow & Snow, supra note 33, at 265–66.
90. Compare N.M. CODE R. 19.15.16.19 (2017) (operators must file disclosure on
FracFocus within forty-five days of completing the well), with MONT. ADMIN. R. 36.22.608
(2018) (operators must disclose fluids to state oil and gas board forty-eight hours before
starting drilling).
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disclosure;91 finally, and most contentiously, the extent to which the
operator’s claim for trade secret protection is verified and subjected to
challenge. 92
1. Methods and Timing of Fracking Fluid Disclosure
Most states that regulate fracking fluid disclosures either require or allow
operators to file their disclosures on FracFocus rather than with a regulatory
body.93 While FracFocus began as a private platform for fracking operators
to make voluntary disclosures, states have adopted it as a central database
for fracking information.94 Due in part to pressure from state regulators,
FracFocus was upgraded in 2013 to include more user-friendly features,
such as allowing users to search by chemical ingredients in addition to
searching by well locations. 95 That said, regulators have not universally
accepted FracFocus, and some maintain independent public disclosure
platforms while others only make fracking fluid disclosures available on
request.96
Just as most states allow operators to post their fluid composition
disclosures to FracFocus, most states only require post-fracking disclosures,
“typically [within] 30 to 60 days after the fracturing is complete.” 97
Because the purpose of fracking fluid disclosures is to provide accurate
information to the public, the prevailing attitude is that pre-fracking
disclosures are unnecessary.98 Moreover, fracking operators typically adjust
91. Compare OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 165:10-3-10 (2019) (operators must disclose base
fluid, each ingredient in chemical additives, and the maximum concentration of the chemical
additives), with LA. ADMIN. CODE. tit. 43, pt. XIX § 118(C)(1)(d) (2015) (operators only
required to disclose chemical additives that are subject to federal regulation as hazardous).
92. Compare CODE ARK. R. § 178.00.1-B-19 (2017) (requiring operator to make written
claim for trade secret protection to state oil and gas commission), with TEX. ADMIN. CODE. §
3.29(c)(2)(C) (2012) (R.R. Comm’n of Tex., Hydraulic Fracturing Chemical Disclosure
Requirements) (operators not required to submit verification for trade secret protection).
93. See Pringle, supra note 87.
94. Hall, supra note 6, at 429.
95. See Pringle, supra note 87.
96. See, e.g., ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 62, § 245.720 (2020) (Department of Natural
Resources responsible for publishing “master lists” of chemical disclosures); IDAHO ADMIN.
CODE r. 20.07.02.211 (2019) (requires disclosure of chemical composition but does not
provide a platform for public access, records available on request).
97. Pringle, supra note 87.
98. Hall, supra note 6, at 424 (“[T]here seems to be little point in requiring a prefracturing disclosure”); Pringle, supra note 87 (“The primary purpose of the disclosure
requirements is to make information available to the public, researchers, and regulators,
which is accomplished by post fracturing chemical disclosures.”).
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their fluid compositions from well to well, so the composition listed in a
pre-fracking disclosure is not guaranteed to be the final formula. 99 As a
result, pre-fracking disclosures requirements are uncommon. 100
2. Scope of Required Disclosures
The successful push for state-level regulation has increased the amount
of publicly available information on fracking fluids. However, the scope of
this information varies by state.
Because the public’s right to know the chemical composition of fracking
fluids is a central tenet of state regulations, it is unsurprising that most
states require fracking operators to disclose the chemical make-up and
concentrations of their fluids.101 The majority approach is to require
fracking operators to disclose all chemical constituents contained in
fracking fluids and their quantities, with a general exception for trade
secrets.102 A minority of states only require fracking operators to disclose
chemicals that qualify as “hazardous” under federal regulations. 103
At a policy level, the varied scope of required disclosures is arguably the
“most important of the differences among the various states’
regulations.”104 Naturally, proponents of fracking fluid regulation have
called for the broadest possible disclosure requirements.105 Moreover, there
are practical advantages to broad chemical disclosures.
The first, and most obvious, benefit of a broad disclosure approach is
that it provides the public and regulators with more information, which is a
significant end to itself, even if the chemicals disclosed are not “hazardous”
as defined by federal regulations. Additionally, there is a risk that limiting
disclosures to “hazardous” chemicals will be underinclusive because the
99. Hall, supra note 6, at 425.
100. But see MONT. ADMIN. R. 36.22.608 (2018) (operators must disclose fluids to the
state oil and gas board forty-eight hours before starting drilling).
101. See, e.g., Matthew McFeeley, Falling Through the Cracks: Public Information and
the Patchwork of Hydraulic Fracturing Disclosure Laws, 38 VT. L. REV. 849, 853 (2014).
102. Id. at 885–86.
103. LA. ADMIN. CODE. tit. 43, pt. XIX § 118(C)(1)(d) (2015) (operators must disclose “a
list of chemical ingredients contained in the hydraulic fracturing fluid that are subject to the
requirements of 29 CFR Section 1910.1200(g)(2) . . . .”); MICH. DEP’T of ENVTL. QUALITY,
SUPERVISOR OF WELLS INSTRUCTION 1-2011 (2011), https://www.michigan.gov/documents/
deq/Supervisor_of_Wells_Insruction_1-2011_428260_7.pdf (only requires the disclosure of
Material Data Safety Sheets, which record “hazardous chemicals” under 29 C.F.R. §
1910.1200).
104. Hall, supra note 6, at 410.
105. See, e.g., McFeeley, supra note 101, at 900.
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federal regulations only require the inclusion of chemicals that are harmful
to humans, not the environment.106 Finally, broader disclosures ultimately
benefit fracking operators, because the public confidence in regulatory
efforts that comes with greater transparency prevents more drastic measures
like fracking bans, and operators still have the option to protect their trade
secrets.107 Therefore, the predominant trend in state fracking fluid
regulations is to require operators to disclose the identity and concentration
of each chemical contained in their fluids. However, in any of these
regulations, the true scope of the disclosure required is inherently limited by
the regulation’s trade secret exception and the extent to which state
regulators verify trade secret claims.
3. Trade Secret Verification and Challenges
Thus, despite the normative importance of the difference in scope
between state fracking fluid regulations, the most varied and contentious
difference between state regulatory schemes is the extent to which
operators’ claims for trade secret protection are verified and the mechanism
for challenging those claims (if any). While all states allow fracking
operators to claim trade secret protection, they vary markedly on whether
those claims must be verified, and whether regulators or private citizens
have standing to challenge those claims through litigation or administrative
proceedings.108 These variations are best illustrated through the regulatory
schemes of four states, roughly classified on a spectrum from strictest to
most lenient: Wyoming, Colorado, Texas, and Louisiana.
As the first state to regulate fracking fluid disclosures, 109 Wyoming
requires upfront verification of trade secret claims. 110 In Wyoming, a
fracking operator must disclose the “stimulation fluid,” the “chemical
compound name . . . of each additive used,” and the “proposed rate of
concentration for each additive” to the state Oil and Gas Conservation
Commission.111 To gain trade secret protection, the operator must “justify[]
and document[] the nature and extent of the proprietary information.” 112
Practically, the Commission requires a two-part verification policy for trade
secret claims—one part “providing justification for deeming all or part of
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Hall, supra note 6, at 411.
See generally Furlow & Hays, supra note 4, at 317–19.
See, e.g., Pringle, supra note 87.
Id.
055-3 WYO. CODE R. § 45(d)(i)–(vi) (2016).
Id.
Id. at § 45(f).
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the formulation of a product to be a trade secret” and the second,
“containing the product name, the product type, the CAS number for each
chemical component of the product, and the concentration of the chemicals
in the product.”113 If the Commission grants the operator’s trade secret
claim, the second part is detached from the disclosure while the nonproprietary information is made publicly available consistent with the
Wyoming Public Records Act (“WPRA”). 114
Thus, because Wyoming’s existing fracking fluid regulations require
written verification of trade secret claims, the WPRA provides a vehicle for
plaintiffs to challenge the trade secret determination through public records
litigation. 115 For example, an environmental coalition concerned that the
Commission was acting as a rubber stamp for fracking operators’ trade
secret claims used this provision to challenge the Commission’s refusal to
turn over fracking disclosures that it deemed trade secrets. 116 The litigation
reached the Wyoming Supreme Court and culminated in a settlement
requiring the Commission to require greater factual support for trade secret
claims made by fracking operators.117
Similarly, Colorado requires fracking operators to disclose the identity
and concentration of each chemical additive used in fracking fluids. 118
Moreover, Colorado requires that operators seeking to protect trade secrets
submit a written claim of entitlement, but, importantly, they are not
required to disclose the chemical identity or concentration of the claimed
trade secret to the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission. 119
Thus, because the operator’s claim for trade secret protection only describes
the essential elements of a trade secret 120 and not the information itself,
there is no clear vehicle for plaintiffs to challenge a trade secret claim
113. Powder River Basin Res. Council v. Wyo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n, 2014
WY 37, 320 P.3d 222, 225–26 (Wyo. 2014).
114. WYO. CODE R. § 45(f).
115. See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 16-4-203(f) (West 2019) (“Any person aggrieved by the
failure of a governmental entity to release records” may challenge denial in district court and
seek an order mandating disclosure).
116. Powder River Basin Res. Council, 320 P.3d at 245; see discussion infra Part III.
117. Stipulated Settlement Agreement at 3, Powder River Basin Res. Council v. Wyo.
Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n, Docket No. 94650-C (7th Judicial District Court, Jan. 14,
2015).
118. See 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:205A(b)(2)(A)(ix)–(xii) (2015).
119. Id. at § 404-1:205A(b)(2)(B).
120. COLO. OIL AND GAS CONSERVATION COMM’N, TRADE SECRET CLAIM OF
ENTITLEMENT FORM 41 FILING, https://cogcc.state.co.us/forms/PDF_Forms/Form41_
05312012.pdf.
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through public records litigation. 121 Further, Colorado’s disclosure
regulations do not include a means of challenging trade secrets.122 That
said, Colorado’s regulations are unique in that they ultimately require
fracking operators to disclose fluid additives “[u]nless the information is
entitled to protection as a trade secret.”123 Commentators have suggested
that the literal interpretation of this provision limits fracking operators to
protecting true trade secrets and that plaintiffs could challenge a trade secret
claim by claiming it was erroneous based on this interpretation. 124
However, to date, there has been no litigation on this point.
Unlike Wyoming and Colorado, Texas does not require any written
documentation or verification of a fracking operator’s claim for trade secret
protection.125 Under Texas’s fracking fluid disclosure regulations, operators
must upload their fluid compositions directly to FracFocus. 126 Fracking
operators may protect claimed trade secrets by excluding the information
from FracFocus, but they must note the trade secret claim on the registry
and provide “the chemical family or other similar description” for the
protected formula.127 Because Texas, like Colorado, does not require
fracking operators to submit the underlying chemical information to state
regulators, there is no avenue for plaintiffs to challenge the trade secret
claim through public records litigation. 128
However, Texas’s fracking fluid regulations expressly provide a
mechanism for challenging trade secret claims. 129 Specifically, a
“landowner on whose property the relevant wellhead is located,” a
“landowner who owns real property adjacent” to the wellhead, or a
“department or agency of this state with jurisdiction over a matter to which
the claimed trade secret information is relevant” may challenge the
operator’s claim for trade secret protection.130 The regulation lays out a
specific procedure for making a written challenge to the trade secret, which

121. See § 404-1:205A(b)(2)(B).
122. See § 404-1:205A.
123. § 404-1:205A(b)(2)(D).
124. See Hall, supra note 6, at 415.
125. 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.29(c)(2)(C) (2012) (R.R. Comm’n of Tex., Hydraulic
Fracturing Chemical Disclosure Requirements).
126. See id. at § 3.29(c)(2)(A).
127. Id. at § 3.29(c)(2)(C).
128. See id. at § 3.29(c).
129. Id. at § 3.29(f).
130. See id. at § 3.29(f)(1)(A)–(C).
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is initially decided by the Texas Office of the Attorney General and is
appealable to a state district court.131
Although Louisiana has adopted regulations requiring the disclosure of
fracking fluid composition, its regulations do not provide for the
verification or challenge of fracking operators’ trade secret claims. 132
Louisiana allows fracking operators to disclose their fluid composition
through state regulators or FracFocus, but it does not require the disclosure
of chemical compositions that operators claim as trade secrets. 133 Rather
than submitting verification of their trade secret claims, Louisiana requires
fracking operators to “disclose the chemical family associated with the
ingredient” and include a “statement that a claim of trade secret protection
has been made by the entity entitled to make such a claim” and “the contact
information of the entity claiming trade secret protection.”134 Because
Louisiana does not require operators to submit the protected information to
regulators, there is no avenue for public records litigation. 135 Moreover,
unlike Texas, Louisiana’s disclosure regulations do not provide for trade
secret challenges.
Ultimately, state fracking fluid regulations are a true patchwork of laws
with varying requirements. Each disclosure regulation creates tensions that
have only deepened as the “shale revolution” has grown in magnitude and
controversy.
III. Key Tensions Between Disclosure Regulations and Trade Secrets
There is an inherent conflict between trade secret protection, which
depends on the information in question being “not generally known,” 136 and
the public’s right to know about the risks posed by fracking fluid
pollution. 137 This conflict shapes fracking disclosure regulations, and it is
markedly visible in two key areas of tension. First, there is a tension
between trade secrets and the public’s right to transparency that plays out
through public records litigation and impacts the way state regulators verify
trade secret claims. Second, there is the highly controversial tension
131. Id. at § 3.29(f)(2)–(10).
132. See LA. ADMIN. CODE. tit. 43, pt. XIX § 118(C)(2) (2015).
133. Id.
134. Id. at § 118(C)(2)(a)(i)–(iii).
135. See id.
136. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985).
137. Hannah Wiseman, Trade Secrets, Disclosure, and Dissent in a Fracturing Energy
Revolution, 111 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 1, 9 (2011) (“To predict the potential effects of
fracing . . . the chemicals within the fluids must be known”).
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between trade secrets and the medical community’s right to access chemical
information that may be pertinent in the wake of a spill or explosion.
A. Trade Secrets and the Threat of Public Records Litigation
Under the most stringent disclosure regimes, regulators vet trade secret
claims by requiring operators to submit the information they seek to protect.
While this approach has the benefit of thoroughly screening trade secret
claims and increasing the amount of publicly available information on
fracking fluids, it also places the claimed trade secrets under government
control. Thus, proprietary information is potentially subject to public
records laws, the “quintessential symbols of government transparency”
enacted in every state.138
While environmental groups champion greater transparency through
public records laws, fracking operators resist these regimes out of a fear
that public records requests are a means for competitors to gain a
competitive advantage through the disclosure of trade secrets. 139 States have
attempted to tackle this problem by exempting trade secrets from their
public records statutes.140 However, when regulators hold the underlying
fracking fluid information, there is still a risk of litigation because potential
plaintiffs can request the information then challenge the regulator’s denial
of the request claiming the trade secret determination is improper. It is
precisely because of this risk that states like Colorado elect not to review
the underlying information in evaluating trade secret claims under their
fracking fluid disclosure regulations. 141
Indeed, shortly after enacting its fracking disclosure regulation,
Wyoming found itself involved in public records litigation. 142 Wyoming’s
138. John Delaney, Comment, Safeguarding Washington’s Trade Secrets: Protecting
Businesses from Public Records Requests, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1905, 1909 (2017).
139. See generally Margaret B. Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., 65 DUKE L.J. 1361, 1379 (2016)
(discussing the phenomenon of competitor firms using public records requests for
commercial advantages).
140. See, e.g., 65 PA. STAT. ANN. § 67.708(b)(11) (West 2009) (“A record that
constitutes or reveals a trade secret or confidential proprietary information” is exempt from
state public records act).
141. 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:205A, App. I (2012) (“[T]he requesting party could
sue the [Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission] in district court to challenge the
trade secret designation. Although the trade secret claimant would likely intervene in the
lawsuit . . . the [Commission] would nonetheless be a party and would have to devote
resources to the litigation. Further, the requesting party could be entitled to its attorneys’ fees
and costs from the [Commission] . . . . The Commission wished to avoid these risks.”).
142. See Powder River Basin Res. Council, 320 P.3d at 226 .
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fracking disclosure regulations include a trade secrets carveout, which
protects proprietary information subject to the terms of the WPRA, the
state’s public records law. 143 In 2011, an environmental coalition submitted
a request under the WPRA for unredacted versions of all undisclosed
chemical information provided to the Commission by a host of fracking
operators including Baker Hughes and Halliburton. 144 The Commission
responded with only redacted versions of the operators’ correspondence and
justified its denial of the coalition’s request under the trade secrets
exemption of the WPRA. 145 The coalition filed two more requests,
challenging the applicability of the trade secrets exemption and urging the
commission to reconsider, both of which the Commission denied. 146
Subsequently, the groups filed a petition for review of administrative
action under Wyoming’s Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”) in state
district court.147 Halliburton intervened in the action, and the parties filed
cross-motions for summary judgment.148 In deciding these motions, the
district court considered its role to be reviewing “the [Commission’s]
decision as an administrative decision” under the APA by determining
whether the Commission’s determination was arbitrary or not in accord
with the law.149 Deciding whether the Commission’s decision was in
accordance with law required the district court to determine whether the
chemical identity of fracking fluids qualified as a trade secret under the
WPRA.150 Because the meaning of trade secret in the context of the WPRA
was an open question, the court looked to three definitions of trade
secrets—the definitions under the Federal Freedom of Information Act
(“FOIA”), the Third Restatement of Unfair Competition, and the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act— and concluded that the chemical information qualified
under all three. 151 Accordingly, the district court found that the Commission
acted in accordance with law under the APA and granted summary
judgment in favor of Wyoming and the fracking operators.152

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

055-3 WYO. CODE R. § 45(f) (2016).
Powder River Basin Res. Council, 320 P.3d at 226.
Id.
Id. at 227.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 228.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The coalition appealed to the Wyoming Supreme Court. On appeal, the
Court focused primarily on whether the district court had applied the
correct standard of review in deciding the parties’ cross-motions for
summary judgment. 153 Ultimately, the Court concluded that the appropriate
procedure for this challenge was under the WPRA, which allows any
person denied access to a public record to apply to a district court for an
order “directing the custodian of the record to show cause” for why the
denial was proper.154 Thus, the Court found that the trial court erred in
applying the administrative standard rather than “engag[ing] in an
independent determination of whether the information withheld was entitled
to trade secret protection under the WPRA.” 155 The proper procedure for
making this determination involves examining the disputed information and
making a judgment as to whether the trade secret determination was correct
through a show cause hearing with “a variety of tools to make evidentiary
determinations,” including affidavits and in camera review of the contested
records.156 Because of this procedural error, the Court reversed the trial
court and remanded the case with instructions to conduct “appropriate
proceedings” if the coalition successfully applied for a show cause order. 157
However, the Court was “unwilling to cast the district court adrift
without some guidance on the standard to be applied in trade secret cases
under the WPRA.”158 The Court highlighted the similarities between the
WPRA and FOIA, including their shared premises that disclosure should
generally prevail over secrecy and their liberal presumption that a denial of
access to public records is contrary to public policy and should only be
allowed with sufficient justification.159 Given these shared philosophies, the
Court determined that the appropriate definition of trade secrets under the
WPRA is the narrow definition used under FOIA. 160 According to this
definition, a trade secret is “a secret, commercially valuable plan, formula,
process, or device that is used for the making, preparing, compounding, or
processing of trade commodities and that can be said to be the end product
of either innovation or substantial effort, with a direct relationship between

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 230.
Id. at 230–31.
Id. at 231.
Id.
Id. at 232.
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the trade secret and the productive process.” 161 Because the Court lacked a
full record, it left the question of whether this definition applied to the
information at issue in this case for the district court.162
On remand, however, the district court never reached this question.
Rather, the parties reached a stipulated settlement agreement, under which
the Oil and Gas Conservation Commission agreed to a more stringent
process for vetting fracking operators’ trade secret claims. 163 Specifically,
the settlement agreement requires the Commission to adopt a detailed
review process that places the onus of gaining trade secret protection on
fracking operators by requiring documentation of issues like the steps taken
to protect the supposed trade secret and the ease with which the formula of
the fluid is identifiable through disclosure of the chemical identity of the
fluid’s additives.164
While Wyoming’s approach to evaluating fracking operators’ trade
secret claims is among the most rigorous in the country, the Powder River
Basin case illustrates the risk of litigation that comes with the tension
between public records laws that favor broad transparency and the
operators’ interest in protecting their valuable trade secrets from being
destroyed through disclosure. When state regulators opt to take custody of
the claimed trade secrets for vetting, the balancing of these interests
requires courts to “to review the disputed information on a case-by-case,
record-by-record, or perhaps even on an operator-by-operator basis.”165
This process, which is arguably necessary to achieving broad disclosure,
strains state resources and forces states like Colorado to abstain from
individually evaluating trade secret claims.
B. Trade Secrets and the Medical Community’s Right to Know
Health and safety concerns are at the core of the movement for greater
transparency in fracking. The potentially harmful impact of slickwater
fluids on drinking water is the “most contentious” issue in the public debate
over fracking,166 and calls for greater disclosure are most pronounced
following disasters like the Monroe County incident. 167 As a result, most
states that regulate fracking fluid disclosure require operators to provide
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id. at 234.
Id. at 234–35.
Stipulated Settlement Agreement, supra note 117, at 3.
Id. at Exhibit B.
Powder River Basin Res. Council, 320 P.3d at 235.
Furlow & Hays, supra note 4, at 292.
See Blake, supra note 46.
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chemical information to emergency responders and medical personnel
irrespective of the information’s status as a trade secret. 168 However, these
provisions generally restrict disclosure of the information beyond the
immediate treatment and require medical personnel to sign non-disclosure
agreements.169 Moreover, these laws often “tie in a ban with harsh penalties
against any disclosure of the formula by the physician.” 170
The restrictive nature of these regulations has drawn the ire of the
medical community, and this conflict has boiled over to litigation. In
Pennsylvania, Dr. Alfonso Rodriguez, a nephrologist, sought to invalidate
the state’s “Medical Gag Rules” on fracking fluid disclosures because they
were an impermissible content-based restriction on his First Amendment
rights.171 Specifically, Dr. Rodriguez sought to invalidate §§ 10 and 11 of
Pennsylvania’s fracking chemical disclosure statute172 because they
interfered with his ethical obligations by preventing him from readily
communicating “which toxins a hemodialysis patient may have been
exposed to.”173 The district court dismissed Dr. Rodriguez’s claim,
concluding that he lacked standing because his claimed injuries were
conjectural and that, even if he had an injury-in-fact, he lacked standing
because his complaint focused on water quality and invalidating the “gag
rules” would not provide him that information. 174 Although commentators
were critical of the district court’s dismissal of Dr. Rodriguez’s strong First
Amendment claim, 175 the Third Circuit ultimately affirmed the dismissal. 176
While Pennsylvania’s “gag rule” laws survived Dr. Rodriguez’s
challenge in federal court, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared them
unconstitutional in 2016, less than two years after the Third Circuit
168. See, e.g., 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.29(c)(4) (2012) (R.R. Comm’n of Tex.,
Hydraulic Fracturing Chemical Disclosure Requirements); T ENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 040053-01-.03(1)(f) (2013).
169. See 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.29(g) (“A health professional or emergency
responder to whom information is disclosed under subsection (c)(4) of this section must hold
the information confidential . . . .”).
170. JAMES T. O’REILLY, THE LAW OF FRACKING § 10.6 (2019).
171. Rodriguez v. Abruzzo, 29 F. Supp. 3d 480, 481–85 (M.D. Pa. 2014), aff’d sub nom.
Rodriguez v. Sec’y of Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. of Pa., 604 F. App’x 113 (3d Cir. 2015).
172. 58 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3222.1(b)(10)–(11) (West 2012).
173. Rodriguez, 29 F. Supp. 3d at 485.
174. Id. at 485–86.
175. See Benjamin W. Cramer, What the Frack? How Weak Industrial Disclosure Rules
Prevent Public Understanding of Chemical Practices and Toxic Politics, 25 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 67, 98 (2016).
176. Rodriguez, 604 F. App’x at 115.
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affirmed the dismissal of Dr. Rodriguez’s case. 177 In Robinson Township, a
group of municipalities, interest groups, and individuals, including
physicians, collectively referred to by the Court as “Citizens,” launched a
broad challenge on Act Thirteen, Pennsylvania’s oil and gas statute on the
grounds that it was a special law in violation of Article III, Section 32 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution. 178
The Citizens challenged multiple provisions of Act Thirteen, including
§§ 3222.1(b)(10) and (b)(11), which restricted “medical professionals’
access to information about chemicals used in the fracking process” that
fracking operators claimed to be trade secrets or confidential, proprietary
information. 179 Section 10 governed medical providers’ right to access
fracking fluid information and the normal course of treatment, and section
11 governed emergency disclosures.180 The Court ultimately concluded that
both provisions foreclosed “health professionals from disclosing to other
health care professionals any clinical findings they make during the course
of treating a patient.”181 Moreover, according to the Court, §§ 10 and 11
improperly restricted physicians’ ability to “to facilitate the development of
effective future treatment plans for such exposures” through publication in
medical journals.182 Because these “sweeping” restrictions were only
afforded to the oil and gas industry, the Court concluded that they were
“special laws” and that “no manifest peculiarity” justified their unique
application to fracking. 183 Thus, the Court deemed the provisions
unconstitutional and enjoined their further application and enforcement.
Robinson Township was a victory for the citizen groups challenging
Pennsylvania’s oil and gas statute, but it ultimately left all parties involved
with more uncertainty than progress. While the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court invalidated the “medical gag rules” on state constitutional grounds, it
did not provide the legislature with guidance on properly regulating the
disclosure of fracking fluid compositions in the medical context. In this
sense, Robinson Township is a symptom of the larger conflict surrounding
trade secrets and the regulation of fracking fluids and the uncertainty that
comes with handling an issue of major public concern through a patchwork
of state regulations.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 147 A.3d 536, 576 (2016).
Id. at 546 (citing PA. CONST. art. III, § 32).
Id. at 569.
58 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3222.1(b)(10)–(11) (West 2012).
Robinson Twp., 147 A.3d at 575.
Id.
Id. at 575–76.
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IV. Fracking Patents—The Way Forward?
As the tension between trade secrets and fracking disclosures appears
increasingly intractable, there is a growing trend of promoting compromise
through an entirely different area of intellectual property law—the law of
patents.
While fracking operators have turned to the patent system since
Stanolind developed the technology in 1948,184 the shale revolution
originated in a time when the fracking sector was “fundamentally patent
free.”185 Since that time, however, the number of fracking patents issued by
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) has increased
substantially.186 Patent applications for fracking fluids are the driving force
behind this increase.187
Several commentators have pointed to fracking patents as the proper
means of resolving the conflict between trade secret protections and
fracking disclosure regulations. 188 This contention is not without merit.
After all, patents are a tool of compromise. To promote “the progress of
science and the arts,”189 Congress established the patent system to grant
inventors private, limited monopolies in exchange for “full disclosure of the
patented invention and its dedication to the public on the expiration of the
patent.”190 This compromise is frequently referred to as the “quid pro quo of
the patent monopoly.”191 The patent quid pro quo is preferable to the
current system of protecting fracking fluids through trade secrets because it
strikes a compromise that is advantageous to all parties involved. With a
limited monopoly, fracking operators can enforce their intellectual property
rights and maintain a competitive advantage, and the disclosure mandated
by patent law provides citizen groups and regulators with detailed
184. Treatment of Wells, U.S. Patent No. 2,596,844 (filed May 28, 1948) (issued May
13, 1952).
185. Golden & Wiseman, supra note 35, at 1000.
186. Cahoy Et Al., supra note 14, at 290–91.
187. Id.
188. See Sarah Spencer, Note, Either Secrecy, or Legal Monopoly: Why We Should
Choose Fracking Patents, 42 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’ Y REV. 599 (2018); John
Craven, Note, Fracking Secrets: The Limitations of Trade Secret Protection in Hydraulic
Fracturing, 16 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 395 (2014).
189. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (grants Congress power to “promote the progress of
science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive
right to their respective writings and discoveries”).
190. Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 255 (1945).
191. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive
Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1022 (1989).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2021

470

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 6

information on the chemical additives used in fracking. However, there are
significant legal and practical obstacles that make fracking patents
untenable as a complete alternative to trade secret protection.
A. The Advantages of Fracking Patents
Overall, the use of patents to protect fracking fluids, as opposed to trade
secrets, provides relative advantages to all parties involved.
Compared to trade secrets, patents provide fracking operators with
stronger, more readily enforceable intellectual property protections.
Because trade secrets depend on secrecy for legal protection, they “stand
ready to be lost forever on the whim of a third party, by inadvertent or
intentional disclosure.”192 Conversely, disclosure is a requirement for patent
protection.193 If a proper disclosure is made and a patent is granted, the
patentee has the right to prevent all others from making, using, selling, or
offering to sell the invention within the United States. 194 While trade secrets
are only protectable against “misappropriation,” fracking operators can
enforce their rights against other parties that infringe their claimed
invention irrespective of whether the party created the invention
independently.195 As a result of the increase in “fracking patents,” fracking
operators have increasingly utilized broad patent protection to pursue
claims of infringement against competitors that have infringed on patented
fluid technology. 196 Simply put, the protection available to patentees is
broader than the protection available through the law of trade secrets, which
only protects against misappropriation and not independent invention or
reverse-engineering.197
Patents also provide fracking operators with greater economic incentives
than trade secrets. While trade secrets can serve as a tool of innovation, 198
there is no novelty requirement for trade secret protection. 199 Alternatively,
novelty is an integral requirement of patent protection. 200 Therefore, to gain
192. 2 MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW § 7.2 (2020).
193. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012).
194. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2010).
195. See, e.g., W. Nicholson Price II, Regulating Secrecy, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1769, 1777
(2016).
196. See generally EnerPol, LLC v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., No. 2019-1079, 2020
WL 1527778 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 31, 2020) (litigation over infringement of U.S. Patent No.
6,949,491, which relates to the use of “degradable polymers” as a fracking fluid).
197. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) cmts. 1–2 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985).
198. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481–85 (1974).
199. Id. at 476.
200. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2015).
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patent protection for a fluid technology, a fracking operator will need to
develop a “new and unique” fluid composition. 201 While trade secret law
provides operators with an incentive to develop unique fluids through the
promise of protection against misappropriation, the possibility of a patent
monopoly and the greater protection that comes with it would likely
incentivize operators to develop better, more advanced fluids. Moreover,
because patents can be easily licensed, operators could add a revenue
stream by developing advanced fluids for particular shale formations and
licensing the fluid composition to competitors operating in the same
formation.202
Likewise, the patent system offers substantial benefits to those who
would prefer broader disclosure of fracking fluid information. Under the
current regulatory patchwork, even the most comprehensive fluid
disclosures offer an incomplete picture of the chemical make-up of fracking
fluids.203 However, to obtain patent protection, an operator would need to
provide a full, clear, and exact written description of the invention with
sufficient information to enable a person “skilled in the art” to make and
use the invention. 204 Accordingly, fracking patent applications provide
more useful information than any existing disclosure regulation. Moreover,
patent law aligns the interests of fracking operators and regulators in two
meaningful ways. First, the patent law includes a limited safe harbor for
individuals using an invention that would otherwise infringe a claimed
invention if the use is in good faith and more than one year before the
patentee filed their application or publicly disclosed their invention. 205 By
design, this defense incentivizes would-be patentees to file an application as
early as possible. In the context of fracking fluids, operators would have an
incentive to file a patent application as soon as they had a completed
formulation. In addition to expanding the scope of the fracking operator’s
patent rights, this early filing would provide regulators and citizens with
comprehensive fluid information either immediately before the fracking
began or shortly after. Second, because the patent system places the burden
of disclosure on the party seeking protection, rather than on a state
regulator, the tension of public records litigation and the accompanying
strain on state resources would be eased significantly.

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Craven, supra note 188, at 419.
See id. at 419–20.
See McFeeley, supra note 101, at 899.
35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012).
35 U.S.C. § 273(a) (2011).
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B. Obstacles to Patent Law as a Viable Alternative to Trade Secrecy
Despite the advantages of fracking patents over trade secrets, there are
significant legal and practical obstacles that will likely prevent the patent
system from supplanting trade secrets as a viable means of protecting fluid
composition for most fracking operators.
1. Legal Obstacles
To successfully obtain a patent, an applicant must meet five
requirements: (1) the subject matter must be patentable under § 101 of the
patent act; (2) the claimed invention must have utility; the claimed
invention must be (3) novel and (4) nonobvious; and (5) the applicant must
disclose the claimed invention with sufficient detail in a written
specification. 206 Of these requirements, utility is unlikely to be an issue in
the context of fracking fluids because a patent will only be withheld on
utility grounds if it “has no practical utility.”207 Moreover, fracking fluids
are likely patentable as a “composition of matter” under § 101.208 Assuming
that the operator provides an adequate disclosure with their application,
non-obviousness and novelty remain the most likely legal obstacles to
patentability for fracking fluids.
The non-obvious requirement asks whether the claimed invention is
enough of technological advance to warrant patent protection. More
specifically, non-obviousness is a question of whether the claimed
invention is an advance over the existing body of publicly available
inventions, known as the prior art, as judged by a “person having
reasonable skill in the art.”209 This requirement is considered by many to be
the “ultimate condition of patentability,” and it is at the heart of the patent
quid pro quo.210 Evaluating the non-obviousness of a claimed invention
requires determining the scope and content of the prior art, assessing the
differences between the claimed invention, and resolving the level of
ordinary skill in the art.211 In the context of fracking fluids, the prior art is
206. MENNELL, LEMLEY & MERGES, supra note 26, at 161.
207. Id.; see also 35 U.S.C. § 101.
208. U.S. Patent No. 6,949,491 (filed Sep. 24, 2002) (issued Sep. 27, 2005) (patent
issued for “[c]omposition and degree of polymerization of the degradable polymer and the
selection of additives may be varied to adjust the viscosity, degradation time and other
properties of the fracturing fluid.”).
209. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2011).
210. Lee Petherbridge & R. Polk Wagner, The Federal Circuit and Patentability: An
Empirical Assessment of the Law of Obviousness, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2051, 2054 (2007).
211. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
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significantly limited by the prevailing trend of protecting fluid formulas as
trade secrets. Therefore, because fracking fluid formulas generally vary by
well and formation, operators should be able to clear this hurdle if their
claimed fluid differs from the body of publicly available formulas in a way
that would not be obvious to an operator of reasonable skill in the art of
composing fracking fluids.
The novelty requirement is, however, the largest legal obstacle to patent
protection for most fracking operators. Like non-obviousness, novelty is “at
the heart of the patent system.” 212 Novelty is a question of whether a
claimed invention is new, as determined by the prior art. Historically,
novelty has been covered under § 102 of the patent act, along with the
related concept of “statutory bars,” which set out actions by the inventor
that preclude a patent from issuing. However, under the America Invents
Act (“AIA”), § 102 was simplified, and removed the distinction between
novelty bars and statutory bars.213 That said, in the wake of the AIA, the
Supreme Court held that the revisions to § 102 did not change the meaning
of previously interpreted terms like “on sale,” so pre-AIA caselaw is useful
in interpreting and applying § 102 bars.214
Presently, an invention is barred from patentability due to a novelty bar if
“the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or
in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the
effective filing date of the claimed invention.” 215 However, in limited
circumstances, a so-called grace period is available if the prior art
disclosure occurred one year or less before the applicant filed to patent their
claimed invention.216 If every element of the claimed invention is disclosed
in the prior art under § 102(a)(1), it is said to be “anticipated” and,
therefore, non-novel.
For fracking operators, the most important form of prior art is “public
use.” In this context, public use is “any use of [the claimed] invention by a
person . . . who is under no limitation, restriction or obligation of secrecy to
the inventor.”217 While the use of fracking fluids on a well is not within
most common definitions of public, the Fifth Circuit established that the
touchstone of publicity is the lack of “deliberate efforts” to conceal the
invention and protect its secrecy in the landmark case of Rosaire v. Baroid
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

1 CHISUM ON PATENTS § 3.01 (2020).
MENNELL, LEMLEY & MERGES, supra note 26, at 201.
Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 628, 630 (2019).
35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2015).
Id. at § 102(b).
Netscape Commc’ns Corp. v. Konrad, 295 F.3d 1315, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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Sales Division National. Lead Co.218 Rosaire involved the use of crude oil
drilling technology in rural east Texas.219 Ultimately, the court determined
that the use was public, even though it was geographically isolated, because
it was “performed in the field under ordinary conditions without any
deliberate attempt at concealment or effort to exclude the public and
without any instructions of secrecy to the employees performing the
work.”220 Therefore, any unrestricted use of the claimed fluid technology
would be a prior art disclosure that anticipates the claimed invention unless
an exception applies under § 102(b). However, most fracking operators are
in a fundamentally different situation than the drillers in Rosaire because
fracking operators typically insist on strict trade secret protection for their
fluid formulas. Therefore, it is unlikely that there will be public use in the
prior art by a third-party fracking operator that creates a novelty bar for a
given formula.
That said, the bigger problem in this context is the applicant’s own
“secret public use.” Specifically, “an inventor’s own prior commercial use,
albeit kept secret, may constitute a public use . . . barring him from
obtaining a patent.”221 This rule serves to channel inventions into the patent
system by forcing inventors to choose between the patent system or trade
secrecy, thereby “foster[ing] disclosure of patented inventions to the
public.”222 Practically, this means that any fracking operator that has used a
fracking fluid commercially for extraction, even under strict trade secrecy,
will be barred from patenting the fluid unless they file within a year of the
first commercial use. 223 While there is a limited exception for experimental
uses,224 the bar triggered by an inventor’s prior commercial use will
preclude many fracking operators from obtaining a patent on their existing
fluid formulas if the fluids are commercially operable and beyond the
experimental stage.225
218. Rosaire v. Baroid Sales Div., Nat. Lead Co., 218 F.2d 72, 74 (5th Cir. 1955).
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Woodland Tr. v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., 148 F.3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
222. Meds. Co. v. Hospira, Inc., 827 F.3d 1363, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
223. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1)(A) (2015).
224. See Meds. Co., 827 F.3d at 1377 (citing Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126,
137 (1877)).
225. See CHISUM, supra note 212, at § 3.05. It is important to note that the USPTO has
taken the position that the AIA’s inclusion of the phrase “or otherwise available to the
public” in section 102(a) did away with “secret public use.” See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK
OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2152.02(c) (9th ed., rev. June 2020)
(“[P]ublic use under AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) is limited to those uses that are available to
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Because of § 102’s bar on prior commercial use, current fracking
operators will not be able to gain patent protection for fluid technologies
currently in use unless they file within one year of the first use of the fluid.
This bar effectively limits the utility of patents as a means of protecting
fracking fluids to new fracking fluids.
2. Practical Obstacles
Even if fracking fluids are patentable, there are practical obstacles that
make it unlikely that many operators will abandon their trade secret claims
in favor of patent protection.
The first obstacle is the process of obtaining a patent through the
USPTO, which is known as patent prosecution. The prosecution process
typically involves several rounds of amendments and negotiations with the
USPTO, and the process takes, on average, over two years to complete. 226
Although roughly three-quarters of all patent applications are ultimately
granted, the prosecution process is inarguably time-consuming and
costly. 227 The prolonged nature of prosecution makes the patent system a
poor fit for fracking operators, many of whom alter their formulas from
well to well and do not perfect their formula in advance of the drilling
operation. 228 Due to the inconsistent nature of fracking fluid formulas,
many operators will likely prefer to continue protecting their intellectual
property through trade secrecy, which requires no application and is created
contemporaneously with the secret.
Moreover, practical problems with enforcement will likely dissuade
many fracking operators from making the transition from trade secrecy to
patents. Because most fracking fluids are protected vigilantly as trade
secrets, and the fluids themselves are injected into the ground, it will be
exceedingly difficult for patentees to detect infringement in the market.
the public.”). But the Supreme Court has strongly suggested otherwise, holding that
“otherwise available to the public” is “catchall phrase” that does not change the meaning of
terms that have acquired an established meaning in pre-AIA caselaw. Helsinn Healthcare
S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 628, 634 (2019). Helsinn involved a challenge to
“secret sales,” so it did not directly resolve this question, but it provides ample reason to
suspect that the same reasoning applies to “secret public use.” Id. (“[T]he addition of ‘or
otherwise available to the public’ is simply not enough of a change for us to conclude that
Congress intended to alter the meaning of [a reenacted term]”).
226. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who’s Patenting What - An Empirical
Exploration of Patent Prosecution, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2099, 2101–03 (2000).
227. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Is the Patent Office a Rubber Stamp?,
58 EMORY L.J. 181, 184–85 (2008).
228. Hall, supra note 6, at 425.
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Commentators have dismissed this concern by arguing that the inability to
enforce patent rights will result in only “somewhat less of a competitive
advantage” because the patent system will still incentivize the creation of
more efficient fluid technology. 229 However, the entire premise of the patent
quid pro quo is that the patentee gains a monopoly over their invention in
exchange for disclosing the information to the public. If enforcement is
impossible, the monopoly ceases to exist, and fracking operators will have
no incentive to develop more efficient technologies to license to
competitors. Moreover, any incentives gained from patenting a fracking
fluid formula must be measured against the costs of patent prosecution.
Without the possibility of enforcing their patent and recouping the fixed
costs of development and prosecution, fracking operators have little reason
to choose patents over trade secret protections.
In short, patents are superior to trade secrets as a means of protecting
fracking fluid technology because they allow operators to maintain their
rights while facilitating thorough disclosure for regulators and private
citizens. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that patents will serve as a viable
alternative to trade secrets industrywide because many operators will be
unable or unwilling to abandon their trade secret protections in favor of
fracking patents.
V. Conclusion
The tension between fracking disclosure regulations and trade secret
protection for fluid compositions is unresolved. While state fracking
regulations have expanded over the past two decades, the public’s
knowledge of fluid compositions remains incomplete, largely because of
the inherent conflict between proprietary information and the public’s right
to know. The growing trend of fracking patents eases this tension and
strikes a more favorable balance between protection and disclosure.
However, because of the immense legal and practical obstacles to
patentability facing most fracking operators, patents are ultimately an
incomplete resolution to this problem.

229. Craven, supra note 188, at 421.
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